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COMENT
TRIAL BY NEWSPAPER
I. INTRODUCTION
"Trial by newspaper," an issue which has plagued the legal profession for
decades, again presented itself when President John F. Kennedy was assassi-
nated. A few hours after the crime, Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested and
charged with his murder. As could be expected, the assassination generated
an enormous amount of news coverage, a portion of which centered around
the developments in Oswald's prosecution. Not only were there newspaper
reports,' but most of the statements of Dallas officials were also reported,
live, by radio and television. 2 Millions of people saw, heard, and read of
the case against Oswald.
There is little doubt that one of the major problems the Texas court would
have faced, had Oswald been brought to trial, would have been the securing
of the impartial jury3 to which every accused is entitled in a criminal prose-
cution.4 Unfortunately, the question of whether twelve impartial individuals
could have been impaneled will never be answered. However, the evils created
by prejudicial publicity remain an important consideration. It would appear
that as long as there are news events which can be sensationally e.\ploited
by the mass media, there will always be "trial by newspaper." Unless adequate
steps are taken to protect the accused, the minds of potential jurors will be
prejudiced as a result of information disseminated to the public by the press.
1. "'e're convinced beyond any doubt that he killed the President,' said Capt. Ill
Fritz, chief of the Dallas Police Homicide Bureau, after questioning Oswald and others. 'I
think the case is clinched.'" N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1963, § 1, p. 1, col. 6. "Dallas County
District Attorney ... said this afternoon: 'I think we have enough evidence to convict him
now but we anticipate a lot more evidence in the next few days.' Id. col. 7. "The [police]
chief summed up the day's work thus: 'I thought the case was in good shapa this morning.
It's even stronger tonight.'" Id. § 1, p. 2, col. 1. "Chief Curry said his department had no
record about Oswald up to yesterday, but that the local office of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation had a long 'subversive' record on him." Id. col. 2.
2. The three television networks devoted their entire schedule to covering the events in
Dallas and Washington.
3. " Nleither the press nor the public had a right to be contemporaneously informed by
the police or prosecuting authorities of the details of the evidence being accumulated against
Oswald. Undoubtedly the public was interested in these disclosures, but its curio ity !hould
not have been satisfied at the expense'of the accused's right to a trial by an impartial jury.
The courtroom, not the newspaper or television screen, is the appropriate forum in our
system for the trial of a man accused of a crime." Report of the President's Commission
on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy 240 (1964) (Warren Commis-lon Report).
4. U.S. Const. amend. VI. "[T]he constitutions of thirty-nine states cmbody a similar
guarantee of imparfialit, and in the remaining eleven it is reasonably inferable from the
right to trial by jury." Will, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, 12 De Paul L. Rev. 197, 199 n.7
(1962).
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II. FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
Whenever the problem of dissemination of prejudicial material is being
discussed, it is important to realize that two fundamental rights are in conflict:
freedom of the press, 5 and the right of an accused to an impartial jury trial,0
one of which must inevitably weigh more heavily on the scales of justice. The
courts apparently place more emphasis on the right to a free press, and this
preeminence is, to a certain extent, unfortunate because it is enabling the
press which lacks concern for or understanding of the issues, to obstruct the
administration of justice. 7
Press releases concerning confessions and prior criminal recordsO of an
accused, and statements by the prosecution concerning his defense'0 are, quite
obviously, an evil if they produce a prejudice in the minds of potential jurors.
In Shepherd v. Florida," the newspapers published, as a fact, a confession
by the defendants to the crime of rape. The sheriff was named as the news
source. The defendants were convicted of the crime although the confessions
were never introduced into evidence. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the conviction without considering the issue of prejudicial publicity.
Mr. Justice Jackson, joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurred on the
ground that the adverse newspaper publicity precluded trial by an impartial
jury.' 2 The Shepherd case is an excellent example of "trial by newspaper,"
illustrating the objectionable extent to which an unfettered press could operate
under the constitutional protection of the first amendment.
IlI. A TEMPORARY CURTAILMENT OF THE PRACTICE: CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
Probably the most effective method presently available to curtail prejudicial
publicity is exercise by the courts of their contempt power.
The modern law of contempt by publication, i.e., a court's power to punish
summarily out-of-court publications that tend to affect the result in a pending
case, goes back to the English case of The King v. Almond," in which Mr.
5. U.S. Const. amend. I.
6. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
7. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310
(1959); People v. Hryciuk, 5 Ill.2d 176, 125 N.E.2d 61 (1954).
8. Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951) (per curiam).
9. United States v. Milanovich, 303 F.2d 626 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 876 (1962);
United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823 (1962).
10. Fouquette v. Bernard, 198 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1952) (prosecuting attorney stated he
was convinced that defendant was sane before, during and after the murders).
11. 341 U.S. 50 (1951) (per curiam).
12. "It is hard to imagine a more prejudicial influence than a press release by the officer
of the court charged with defendants' custody stating that they had confessed . . . ." Id.
at 52 (concurring opinion).
13. Wilmot, Notes and Opinions of Judgments 243 (1802). "The rules for preserving
discipline essential to the administration of justice, came into existence with the law itself,
and Contempt of Court (contemptus curiae) has been a recognized phase in English law
from the twelfth century to the present time." Fox, The History of Contempt of Court 44
(1927).
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Justice Wilmot stated that the practice of exercising summary jurisdiction"
in contempt cases was established by "immemorial usage." The Almond
case was followed by Roaclz v. Garvanlu in which Lord Hardwicke reiterated
the importance of the courts' power to punish those who interfered with the
administration of justice.' These early cases established a pattern for later
years, and the principles propounded are still observed in England today.-,
A. Punishment of Contempt in the Federal Courts
In 1789, Congress enacted legislation which expressly granted to the courts
the power to exact punishment summarily for contemptuous acts. 1 The
power of the federal courts to punish an out-of-court publication summarily,
remained unchanged until 1831 when a new federal contempt statute was
passed' 9 as a result of an impeachment proceeding brought against a federal
district court judge2- who was charged with abusing his contempt powers. 2 1
Although the judge was acquitted, Congress realized that a change in the
law was necessary.2 2 The Act of March 1831 was interpreted by the courts
to be a limitation upon their power to punish for contempt2 However, in
the years following the Civil War, restrictions on the use of the judicial
power to punish out-of-court contempts were gradually discarded, and in 1918
the trend was completely reversed.
That year, in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United Statesi "l the Supreme Court
reviewed on certiorari a trial court's summary judgment holding a newspaper
guilty of contempt. While litigation between the city of Toledo and a local
14. One of the major criticisms of the law of contempt by publication in the United
States is its summary proceeding. For a discussion of the reason why contempt by publica-
tion is punished summarily, see Sullivan, Contempts by Publication 3-6, 192-94 (3d ed.
1941).
15. 2 Atk. 469, 26 Eng. Rep. 6S3 (Ch. 1742).
16. "Nothing is more incumbent upon courts of justice, than to preserve their procding-s
from being misrepresented; nor is there any thing of more pernicious consequence, than to
prejudice the minds of the publick against persons concerned as parties in causes, fore the
cause is fnaly heard." Id. at 469, 26 Eng. Rep. at 633. "There cannot be any thing of
greater consequence, than to keep the streams of justice clear and pure .... " Id. at 471,
26 Eng. Rep. at 6S5.
17. Regina v. Odhas Press Ltd., [19571 1 Q.B. 73 (1956); Regina v. Evening Standard
Co., [1954] 1 Q.B. 573. For an excellent aiscussion of the English law on the cubject of
contempt by publication, see Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law,
43 Harv. L. Rev. SS5 (1935).
13. judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 33.
19. Act of Mlarch 2, 1331, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. 437.
20. Stansbury, Trial of James H. Peck (1333).
21. The judge had disbarred and imprisoned an attorney because he published a criticism
of one of the judges' opinions which was av.aiting appeal.
22. See Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 23 Colum. L. Rev.
401, 525 (1923).
23. E.g., Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 W, all.) 505 (1373); Ex parte Poulson, 19 Fed.
Cas. 1205 (No. 11350) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1335).
24. 247 U.S. 402 (1913).
1964]
FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW
corporation was pending in the trial court, the defendant newspaper had
published articles that indirectly referred to the duties and powers of that court,
and questioned whether the court had any right to afford relief in the matter.
The Toledo Newspaper Company contended that under the contempt statute
the court lacked the power to punish its acts as contemptuous, and further,
that even if it did have the power, the contempt statute was inapplicable
because the publications in question were safeguarded by the first amendment
guarantee of freedom of the press. The Supreme Court, affirming the contempt
conviction, construed the contempt provision of the Judicial Code2r (formerly
the Act of March 2, 1831)26 as giving the judiciary the power to punish
summarily for contempt any act which tends to obstruct the administration of
justice.2 7 The Court stated that freedom of the press, like "every other right
enjoyed in human society, is subject to the restraints which separate right
from wrong-doing."'28 Outlining the test to be used to determine whether an
act is contemptuous, the Court stated that it is "not the influence upon the
mind of the particular judge [that] is the criterion but the reasonable ten-
dency of the acts done to influence or bring about the baleful result . . .,,2
Unfortunately Toledo Newspaper was expressly overruled in Nye v. United
States,3 and the trend toward liberalization was abruptly halted. The trial
court in Nye found the petitioners guilty of contempt for actsal occurring
more than 100 miles away. The basic issue was whether the "conduct of
petitioners constituted 'misbehavior . . . so near' the presence of the court(as to obstruct the administration of justice' within the meaning of . . .,,as
the contempt statute.33 The Supreme Court, in reversing the court below, 4
25. Judicial Code § 268, 36 Stat. 1163 (1911).
26. Ch. 99, § 17, 4 Stat. 487 (1831).
27. 247 U.S. at 419.
28. Id. at 420.
29. Id. at 421. (Emphasis added.)
30. 313 U.S. 33, 52 (1941). "If that phrase ['so near thereto'] be not restricted to acts In
the vicinity of the court but be allowed to embrace acts which have a 'reasonable tendency'
to 'obstruct the administration of justice' . . . then the conditions which Congress sought to
alleviate in 1831 have largely been restored." Id. at 49.
31. The petitioners had used undue influence upon an administrator to get him to
terminate a wrongful death action.
32. 313 U.S. at 44-45.
33. Judicial Code § 268, 36 Stat. 1163 (1911). This has been explicitly incorporated Into
18 U.S.C. § 401 (1958), which reads as follows: "A court of the United States shall have
power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority,
and none other, as-(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice ... .
34. 313 U.S. 33 (1941). The Court reversed even though they felt the petitioners' acts
were reprehensible. If their acts were to be punished, the petitioners were entitled to the
"normal safeguards surrounding criminal prosecutions." Id. at 53. In Green v. United States,
356 U.S. 165, 194 (1958), Mr. Justice Black, in a dissenting opinion in which two other
Justices joined, stated that he "would reject those precedents which have held that the fed-
eral courts can punish [those defendants charged with criminal contempt] ...by means of
a summary trial .. . "
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reviewed the history of the contempt statute,35 and concluded that the phrase
"so near thereto" has a geographical connotation, suggesting "proximity
not relevancy."'3 6
The result is that the federal courts, under NVye, cannot punish the press
by means of contempt proceedings unless the contempt is either committed
in the courtroom or in the vicinity of the court itself, and therefore cannot
punish an out-of-court publication. If Toledo NXcwspapcr were still good law,
however, there would probably be fewer instances of "trial by newspaper."
The risk of being held in contempt and subjected to either fine or imprison-
ment as a result of a publication having a reasonable tendency to obstruct
the administration of justice would be a satisfactory deterrent.
B. Punishment for Contempt in the State Courts
Today, the power of the state courts to punish out-of-court publications for
contempt is restricted to those instances where the publication constitutes a
"clear and present danger" to the administration of justice. This was not al-
ways the situation. The state courts almost invariably accepted and followed,37
The King v. Almond 5s and Roach v. Garvan3 9 Because of the protest against
the courts' summary exercise of the contempt power, however, Pennsylvania,
and later New York, adopted legislation4" that greatly confined the contempt
jurisdiction of courts in those states. Other states followed suit,4 1 patterning
their contempt statutes after the New York and federal- statutes. This legisla-
tion did not, however, prevent the state courts from exercising that power.
They circumscribed the statutes by concluding that their inherent power ex-
tended to the infliction of summary punishment 43 or that the restrictive statutes
were merely declaratory and could not be construed as curtailing their in-
herent power.4 4 At the turn of the nineteenth century, approximately seventeen
state courts had reasserted their contempt power with respect to out-of-court
publications 45
This trend toward liberality was reversed and the contempt power was dealt
35. The Court construed the Act of March 1331 as narrowly confining that category of
criminal cases that could be tried without a jury. 313 U.S. at 47.
36. Id. at 49.
37. Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319 (17S) ; Bayard & Petit v. Pasfmore, 3
Yeates 43S (Pa. 1S02).
33. See notes 13 & 14 supra and accompanying text.
39. See notes 15 & 16 supra and accompanying text.
40. Pa. Acts 1S03-1S09, ch. 7S, at 146 (now Pa. Stat. Ann. tit 17, § 2044 (1962)); 2 N.Y.
Rev. Stat. 28, § 10 (1S29) (now .Yr. judidary Law § 7-50).
41. See Nefles & King, supra note 22, at 554-62.
42. Act of March 2, 1S31, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. 4S7.
43. See, e.g., Bradley v. State, 111 Ga. 16S, 36 S.E. 630 (1900); Carter v. Commonwealth,
96 Va. 791, 32 S.E. 7S0 (1S99).
44. See, e.g., Cheadle v. State, 110 Ind. 301, 11 N.E. 426 (1SS7); Middlebrook v. State,
43 Conn. 257 (1S76).
45. See Nelles & King, supra note 22, at 537-3S.
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a fatal blow by the United States Supreme Court in a trilogy of cases.4" In
Bridges v. California,47 the Court held that the first amendment, made appli-
cable to the states by the fourteenth amendment, forbade punishment by con-
tempt for comment on any pending case, in the absence of a showing that the
statements created a "clear and present danger"'48 to the administration of jus-
tice. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, contended that the majority's test
sanctioned, in effect, "trial by newspaper," 49 and enabled first amendment
guarantees to nullify the right to an impartial trial. 0 In a later case, Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter, again departing from the majority, interpreted the Court's de-
cisions as limiting the contempt power of the state court to instances "when the
misbehavior physically prevents proceedings from going on in court, or occurs
in its immediate proximity." 5'
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the "clear and present danger" test in Penne-
kamp v. Florida,52 Craig v. Harney,5 3 and more recently in Wood v. Georgia.4
In all of these cases the Court reversed a state court's conviction of contempt.
An important factor to note, however, is that Bridges, Pennekamp, and Craig
involved publications concerning matters that were tried without a jury."
46. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
47. Supra note 46. The Court reviewed two state court convictions for contempt by
publication. One of the cases concerned an editor and publisher who published editorials
and comments about pending cases while the defendants were awaiting sentence. The other
case involved the conviction of a labor leader for the publication of a telegram that he sent
to the Secretary of Labor, which criticized the decision of a state judge in a labor case and
indicated that a strike would follow the enforcement of the court's decree.
48. "What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working principle
that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high before utterances can be punished." Id. at 263.
49. Id. at 279, 280 (dissenting opinion).
50. Id. at 284 (dissenting opinion),.
51. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 391 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
52. 328 U.S. 331 (1946). Petitioners were responsible for the publication of two editorials
and a cartoon criticizing actions previously taken by a Florida court in non-jury proceedings,
53. 331 U.S. 367 (1947). Petitioner criticized a judge, who was a layman, for taking a
case from the jury, and characterized the judge's decision as "arbitrary" and "a travesty on
justice."
54. 370 U.S. 375 (1962). Sheriff-petitioner issued a press statement criticizing a judge's
charge to a grand jury, and urged that the citizens take note that a judge threatened
political intimidation and persecution of voters under the guise of law enforcement. The
Court stated: "[Wle need not pause here to consider the variant factors that would be
present in a case involving a petit jury." Id. at 389.
55. The comments "concerned the attitude of the judges toward those who were charged
with crime, not comments on evidence or rulings during a jury trial. Their effect on juries
that might eventually try the alleged offenders ... is too remote for discussion." Pennekamp
v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348 (1946). However, it was Mr. Justice Frankfurter's belief that
prejudicial or poisonous comment can also have an effect on the judges, as well as the jurors.
Id. at 359 (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Craig v. Harney, 331
U.S. 367, 396 (1947), stated: "I do not know whether it is the view of the Court that a
In Baltimore Radio Show v. StaterG however, the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals reversed a trial court conviction of contempt by publication on the
ground that the broadcast did not constitute a "clear and present danger." The
majority suggested that the Supreme Court decisions should be extended to
cases in which jurors or potential jurors are to decide a case.r 7 The effect, if this
dictum is followed, would be to severely limit the power of the states to effec-
tively control the publication of prejudicial matter.
IV. RELIEF AVAILABLE TO THE AccusEn
If the courts are unable to control the promulgation of prejudicial material,
the criminal defendant has to rely on the procedural safeguards designed to
protect him against adverse publicity.
A. Change of Venue
The most frequently used device for avoiding the effect of community hos-
tility is the motion for change of venue. Federal procedureig and that of many
states,59 provide for a change of venue in criminal proceedings when the de-
fendant is unable to obtain a fair and impartial trial in the jurisdiction where
the crime has been committed. In both the federal and state courts, the motion
is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court c0 and the defendant must
show that local prejudice is such as to prevent him from obtaining a fair trial
by an impartial jury.1 In many cases, decision upon the defendant's motion for
judge must be thickskinned or just thickheaded, but nothing in my experience or ob:er-a-
tion confirms the idea that he is insensitive to publicity."
56. 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 912 (1990). This was an
appeal from a lower court ruling which found the defendant guilty of contempt. The charge
came about as a result of a broadcast over local radio stations concerning news reports
relating to the defendant, who was then in the custody of the police on a charge of murder.
The news reports consisted of statements that he had confesed to the commison of a rape
and assault on another woman prior to the commission of the murder. The news reporter
also informed the public of defendant's prior criminal record. Because of the adverze pub-
licity, defendant waived his right to a jury trial. See notes 91-93 infra and accompanying
text.
57. Id. at 50S (dictum).
53. Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(a).
59. See, e.g., Cal. Pen. Code § 1033; Conn. Gen. Stat. Anm. § 54-73 (1958); Ind. Ann.
Stat. § 9-1301 (1956); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 344(2); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2931. 29
(Page 1953); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 551 (1964); N.J. Rules 3:6-2.
60. Hoffa v. Gray, 323 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 907 (1963); Shokldey
v. United States, 166 F.2d 704 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 850 (1943); United States
v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United
States v. Bufalino, 2S5 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1960); State v. Taborsky, 20 Conn. Supp. 242,
131 A.2d 337 (Super. Ct. 1957), aff'd, 147 Conn. 194, 153 A.2d 239 (1960); State v. Wise, 19
N.J. 59, 115 A.2d 62 (1955); People v. Buchalter, 2S9 N.Y. 181, 45 .E.2d 225 (1942),
aft'd, 319 U.S. 427 (1943); Commonwealth v. Spallone, 154 Pa. Supar. 232, 35 A.2d 727
(1944).
61. United States v. Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); State v. Tabor-s!hy, upra
note 60; State v. Wise, supra note 60; People v. Grennan, 2S4 App. Div. 657, 134 N.Y.S.2d
676 (3d Dep't 1954) (per curiam).
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a change of venue has been postponed until after the voir dire, i.e., examination
of the prospective jurors. 62
Change of venue, however, does not always accomplish its purpose. Aside
from the fact that the relief is sparingly granted, 3 the defendant can
never be sure that the adverse publicity has not preceeded him into the juris-
diction to which the trial has been moved.0 4 Would it not be futile to trans-
fer a case that has received widespread publicity to another jurisdiction,
merely because the two places are separated by distance? 5 It should also be
noted that whenever a defendant in a federal prosecution is put in the position
of seeking a change of venue, he is giving up his constitutional right to be tried
by "an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed .... "GO
B. Motion for Continuance
Decision on a motion for continuance or postponement of trial until the
publicity abates in both federal and state courts, is within the sound discretion
of the trial court 67 and is not reversible except when there has been an abuse of
62. E.g., Hoffa v. Gray, 323 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 907 (1963);
United States v. Dioguardi, 147 F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). The voir dire is a device
used to determine whether it is possible to secure an impartial jury. It is felt that by
questioning the prospective veniremen the court and the attorneys can determine which
jurors have formed fixed opinions as to the guilt or innocence of the accused.
63. The fact that the defendant has been the subject of substantial prejudicial publicity Is
not sufficient grounds for a change of venue. See United States v. Dioguardi, 20 F.R.D. 33
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); State v. Taborsky, 20 Conn. Supp. 242, 131 A.2d 337 (Super. Ct. 1957),
aff'd, 147 Conn. 194, 158 A.2d 239 (1960) ; State v. Collins, 2 N.J. 406, 67 A.2d 158 (1949);
People v. Sandgren, 190 Misc. 810, 75 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup. Ct. 1947).; Commonwealth v.
Richardson, 392 Pa. 528, 140 A.2d 828 (1958). This has been justified on the ground that If
newspaper articles furnished ground for removal, no defendant could ever be tried in a
celebrated case in the jurisdiction in which the crime was committed. People v. Brindell, 194
App. Div. 776, 781, 185 N.Y. Supp. 533, 536 (1st Dep't 1921).
64. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). The petitioner was arrested for
murder in Vandenburgh County, Indiana. As a result of prejudicial publicity, defendant's
counsel moved for a change of venue, which was granted. The trial was moved to a nearby
county which had also been subjected to the adverse publicity. The Indiana statute provided
for only one change of venue. The defendant was tried and convicted, but, on appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed.
65. See Shockley v. United States, 166 F.2d 704 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 850
(1948). The defendants were convicted of murdering a prison guard while attempting to
make an escape from Alcatraz. The court stated: "Newspapers and radio carried to the
entire country frequent and detailed descriptions of the progress and results of the 'Alcatraz
affair,' and it does no violence to logic or reason to assume that the effect on readers and
radio listeners in other sections would not be perceptibly diminished by the one element
of distance from San Francisco." Id. at 709-10.
66. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
67. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Hardy v. United States, 186 U.S.
224 (1902); State v. Ovecchio, 27 N.J. Super. 484, 99 A.2d 595 (Super. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 16
N.J. 125, 106 A.2d 541 (1954); People v. Jackson, 111 N.Y. 362, 19 N.E. 54 (1888); Com-
monwealth v. Speroff, 169 Pa. Super. 197, 82 A.2d 569 (1951).
that discretion."5 That there has been widespread adverse publicity concern-
ing the defendant is, by itself, not a sufficient ground for granting such a mo-
tion,69 and, as on motions for change of venue, the court looks to the ,oir dire to
determine whether an impartial jury trial is available to the defendant. ° In
only a few instances have convictions been reversed because of the lower court's
failure to grant the defendant's motion for continuance. 71 In one of these, De-
laney v. United States,72 a Collector of Internal Revenue was indicted for tak-
ing payments proffered to influence him on pending matter. Prior to the trial, a
congressional subcommittee held a hearing which focused upon defendant. The
defendant's motion for continuance was denied by the trial court. The court of
appeals reversed and ordered a new trial. It stated that the publicity given to
the hearing afforded the public a preview of the prosecution's case against the
defendant without the safeguards that would attend a criminal trial. The court
went on to say: "[I] t seems to us neither right, nor in harmony with the spirit of
the Sixth Amendment for the United States to make him stand trial while the
damaging effect of all that hostile publicity may reasonably be thought not
to have been erased from the public mind.1173
Even though the court reversed the conviction in Delaney, it is doubtful
whether a postponement would have been of any advantage to the defendant.
There was nothing to prevent the press from disseminating similiar prejudicial
information at a later date. Furthermore, would not the defendant's right 'to a
"speedy trial" under the sixth amendment be infringed?
C. Voir Dire
The method of conducting the voir dire is generally governed by statute.74
As was previously stated, many courts will postpone a decision on a motion for
a change of venue and motion for continuance until after the voir dire.-
A prospective juror who states upon examination that he can set aside an
opinion already formed, may be accepted; but it appears highly likely that his
opinion, previously formed, will remain in his subconscious. 7
68. Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (Ist Cir. 1952); State v. Oreechio, supra
note 67; People v. Jackson, supra note 67; Commonwealth v. Speroff, supra note 67.
69. Finnegan v. United States, 204 F.2d 105, 110 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 821
(1953); United States v. Kahaner, 204 F. Supp. 921, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v.
Hoffa, 156 F. Supp. 495, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); State v. Orecchio, supra note 67; People v.
Del Rio, 215 N.Y.S.2d 369 (CL Gen. Sess. 1961); Commonwealth v. Spallone, 154 Pa. Supzr.
282, 35 A.2d 727 (1944).
70. United States v. Kahaner, supra note 69; United States v. Hoffa, supra note 69;
People v. Del Rio, 215 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1961); Commonwealth v. Niemi, 365
Pa. 105, 73 A.2d 713 (1950).
71. Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952); Commonwealth v. Balls,
160 Pa. Super. 148, 50 A.2d 729 (1947).
72. Supra note 71.
73. Id. at 114.
74. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 51-240 (1953); Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a); N.J. Rules
3:7-2.
75. See notes 62 & 70 and accompanying text.
76. See note S3 infra. In Crawford v. United States, 212 US. 183, 196 (1909), the Court,
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A prospective juror may, however, be eliminated upon a challenge for cause.
The test for determining whether the challenge will be sustained is found in
Reynolds v. United States. 7 On voir dire, two jurors stated that they had
formed an opinion prior to being called as jurors. The defendant's counsel chal-
lenged the prospective veniremen for cause, but the trial court overruled the
challenge. The Supreme Court, affirming the lower court, stated:
"[L]ight impressions which may fairly be presumed to yield to the testimony that
may be offered, which may leave the mind open to a fair consideration of the testi-
mony, constitute no sufficient objection to a juror; but that those strong and deep
impressions which close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposi-
tion to them, which will combat that testimony and resist its force, do constitute a
sufficient objection to him." 78
The Court went on to say that:
The theory of the law is that a juror who has formed an opinion cannot be impartial,
Every opinion which he may entertain need not necessarily have that effect.... It is
clear ... that upon the trial of the issue of fact raised by a challenge for such cause the
court will practically be called upon to determine whether the nature and strength of the
opinions formed are such as in law necessarily to raise the presumption of partiality.
The question thus presented is one of mixed law and fact . . . . The finding of the
trial court upon that issue ought not to be set aside by a reviewing court, unless the
error is manifest.79
In Irvin. v. Dowd,80 the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the
petitioner was tried by an impartial jury. After the petitioner was taken into cus-
tody, the prosecutor and police officials issued press releases, stating that the
defendant had confessed to six murders. These statements were given extensive
publicity. At the indictment the petitioner was granted a change of venue. The
trial was moved to a neighboring county which had also been subjected to the
inflammatory publicity. The petitioner moved for another change of venue, but
it was denied.8 ' The jury panel consisted of 430 persons of which 268 were
excused at voir dire because they were convinced that the petitioner was guilty.
Of the twelve persons selected as jurors, eight admitted that they felt the pe-
titioner was guilty, but each stated that, notwithstanding his preconceived opin-
ion, he could render an impartial verdict. The Supreme Court reversed the con-
discussing the qualifications of a juror, stated: "Bias or prejudice is such an elusive condition
of the mind that it is most difficult, if not impossible, to always recognize its existence, and
it might exist in the mind of one ... who was quite positive that lie had no bias, and said
that he was perfectly able to decide the question wholly uninfluenced by anything but the
evidence."
77. 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145 (1878). See State v. Klein, 97 Conn. 321, 116 Atd. 596 (1922);
State v. Grillo, 16 N.J. 103, 106 A.2d 294 (1954) Commonwealth v. Richardson, 392 Pa.
528, 140 A.2d 828 (1958) ; N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 376(2).
78. 98 U.S. (8 Otto) at 155.
79. Id. at 155-56. (Emphasis added.)
80. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
81. The motion was denied because it was statutorily provided that a defendant was
entitled to only one change of venue. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-1305 (1956).
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viction on the ground that the petitioner was denied a fair trial 2 'Mr. Justice
Clark, writing for the majority, recognized that partiality is difficult to set
aside,8 but that: "To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion
as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut
the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an
impossible standard."8s4
In Beck v. Washington, the Court, determining whether jurors met the re-
quirement of impartiality, quoted favorably the dictum in the Irvin case and
held that there was no denial of due process. 0 Thus, it is still possible under
present law for an accused to be tried before twelve individuals who admittedly
have been exposed to prejudicial material. This is, of course, limited by the
Irvin case; but should the standard in Irvin be applied only when ninety per
cent of the prospective jurors, and two-thirds of those seated on the jury, have
an opinion as to guilt of the accused?6 7 The federal courts have afforded greater
protection to the accused against the effects of adverse publicity. In Marshall
v. United States,8s some of the jurors, during the trialp saw and read newspaper
articles alleging that the petitioner had been convicted of two prior felonies.
The trial judge, prior to the publication of the accused's record, had re-
fused to allow the prosecution to introduce into evidence the fact that pe-
titioner had previously practiced medicine without a license. When the judge
learned that the news accounts reached the jurors he summoned them, individ-
82. "In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial
by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing
violates even the minimal standards of due process." 366 U.S. at 722.
83. "The influence that lurks in an opinion once formed is so parsistent that it uncon-
sciously fights detachment from the mental processes of the average man." Id. at 727.
84. Id. at 723 (dictum).
85. 369 U.S. 541 (1962).
86. Id. at 557.
87. For a negative answer, see United States e% rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 372 US. 973 (1963). However, the fact situation was very similar to
Irvin. "Of the 16 jurors seated in the case as regular and alternate jurors, only one had not
read of the case. Of the 16, eight stated that they had formed no opinion of guilt or inno-
cence, the other eight stated that they had formed an opinion of guilt, but esprsced them-
selves in various terms as being able to change the opinion or to render an impartial verdict"
Id. at 367-68.
88. 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
89. Note that previously the discussion concerned only pretrial publicity. In United
States ex rel. Brown v. Smith, 306 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 959 (1963),
petitioner's prior criminal record was reported in the town newspaper three months before
trial. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus was granted by the district court on the ground
that petitioner was tried by a prejudicial jury in violation of his rights under the fourteenth
amendment. The court of appeals, reversing, stated: "If this had been a federal trial and
jurors had admitted to reading contemporaneous reports of a defendants criminal record,
our supervisory power over the administration of federal justice would compel us to reverse"
Id. at 603. This may be an indication of the willingness of a federal court to reverse a con-
viction based on a federal offense, given the same facts as those presented in the Brown
case.
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ually, into his chambers and inquired if they had seen the articles. Each of the
jurors who had seen or read the articles assured the trial judge that he would not
be influenced by them and that he could decide the case solely on the evidence
presented in court. The Supreme Court, invoking its supervisory power over the
administration of criminal justice in the federal courts, reversed the lower court
conviction, stating:
We have here the exposure of jurors to information of a character which the trial
judge ruled was so prejudicial it could not be directly offered as evidence. The preju-
dice to the defendant is almost certain to be as great when that evidence reaches the
jury through news accounts as when it is a part of the prosecution's evidence. 0
Surely, the application of different standards in the state and federal courts,
to determine the extent of a juror's impartiality violates the ideal of equal jus-
tice for all.
D. Waiving a Jury Trial
The most drastic method to avoid trial by a jury subjected to prejudicial
publicity is to waive a jury trial.91 Under the federal rules, a defendant cannot
waive this right unless he does so "in writing with the approval of the court
and the consent of the government. '9 2 Although the purpose of the statute is
primarily remedial, its effectiveness is highly questionable. In certain instances,
the statute may even have the effect of compelling the accused to proceed to
trial before a prejudiced jury.93
Thus, the problem is clearly presented: the defendant is arrested, the press
receives or discovers information prejudicial to the defendant, the information
is disseminated to the public, and relief available to defendant to counteract the
effects of "trial by newspaper" is inadequate. The situation has reached a
point where the accused may even consider giving up the fundamental right of
trial by jury.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Until this point, it would appear as if only the press bore responsibility for
the result of prejudicial publicity. This, of course, is not the case. It is obvious
that without dissemination of the harmful material the practice could not
continue, but one must consider the problem of how the press obtains its infor-
mation. Prejudicial material published by the press is not acquired solely by pro-
digious work on the part of its investigative staff. Surely, were it not for in-
90. 360 U.S. at 312-13.
91. See generally Donnelly, The Defendant's Right to Waive Jury Trial in Criminal Cases,
9 U. Fla. L. Rev. 247 (1956).
92. Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a). Many states also provide for waiver. E.g., N.Y. Const. art. 1,
§ 2; Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 54-82 (1958); Pa. Stat. Ann. fit. 19, § 786 (1964); N.J. Rules
3:7-1(a).
93. See Donnelly, supra note 91, at 254. The state provisions in note 92 supra, with the
exception of Connecticut's, would have the same effect with respect to the crimes of murder
and treason.
[Vol. 33
formation "leaked" to the press by the prosecuting attorneys, 4 defense at-
torneysP and members of law enforcement agencieso prior to trial, the press
would have no access to prejudicial material: e.g., prior criminal records, con-
fessions and other evidence that may be declared inadmissable at trial. Any
proposal that is to be effective must include provisions that would deter the
above groups from issuing statements to the press that include material which
may preclude trial of the defendant by an impartial jury.
The American Bar Association at its August 1964 meeting referred to com-
mittee a proposed amendment to its canons of ethics which would forbid pros-
ecution and defense lawyers from trying their cases in the press. The amendment
read as follows:
It is the duty of a lawyer engaged either in the prosecution or the defense of a person
accused of a crime to refrain from any action which might interfere with the right of
either the accused or the prosecuting governmental entity to a fair trial. To that end
it is improper and professionally reprehensible for a lawyer so engaged to ecpress to
the public or in any manner extrajudicially any opinion or prediction as to the guilt
or innocence of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him or the likelihood
that he will be either convicted or acquitted.P7
How effective this amendment will be, if adopted, cannot be determined at
the present time; but it is hoped that it will make a deeper impression on the
members of the bar and have a greater influence than did its predecessor, Canon
20.9s Although Canon 20 was adopted by the association in 1908, there has not
been a single case of enforcement under it. 9 Does this mean that since 190S
there has not been a single incident of "newspaper publication by a lawyer as
to pending or anticipated litigation" which interfered "with a fair trial in the
Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice"? Obviously
such incidents have occurred, and if the enforcement of Canon 20 is any in-
94. For an example of material given to the press by a prosecuting attorney, see Stroble
v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952). 'Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, stated: "To have
the prosecutor himself feed the press with evidence that no self-restrained pre:3 ought to
publish in anticipation of a trial is to make the State itself through the prosecutor, vho
wields its power, a conscious participant in trial by newspaper .... " Id. at 201.
95. For an example of defense counsel trying his case in the press, recall the trial of
Jack Ruby.
96. See remarks made by police authorities after the assassination of President Rennedy,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1963, § 1, p. 1, col. 6, and p. 2, col. 2.
97. N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1964, p. 34, col. 2. The amendment is scheduled to be reported
out of committee in 1965.
93. ABA, Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 20, reads as follows: ".qvpap2r pub-
lications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere vith a fair trial
in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they are
to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to
the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts
should not go beyond quotation from the records and paper on file in the Court; but even
in extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex parte statement" (Italics omitted.)
99. N.Y.L.J., May 8, 1964, p. 1, col. 5. Canon 20 is effective in practically every state in
the form of either a statute, court rule or state bar canon. Ibid.
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dication of how the proposed amendment will be enforced then something more
than an amendment to the canons of ethics is required. Of course the American
Bar Association has taken a step in the right direction; but without a con-
scientious effort on the part of the bar and the bench to enforce the proposed
amendment, its adoption is meaningless.
While considering the association's new amendment, note should be taken of
the omission, and rightly so, of any provision concerning the conduct of law en-
forcement officers with respect to the issuing of press releases. The disclosure
of prejudicial material by police officers should be the concern of local law en-
forcement agencies, 1'0 and state and federal legislatures.
Another proposed solution is the convening of a meeting between bench, bar
and press to work out some kind of agreement whereby the press would adopt a
code of ethics to govern the publication of material dealing with criminal prose-
cution."" At first glance, a voluntary agreement on the part of the press to restrain
itself from disseminating prejudicial material appears to be the ideal solution to
this perplexing problem. If all the members of the press agreed to abide by a set
of standards proposed by a committee made up of representatives of the bench, the
bar, and the press, perhaps further action would not be necessary. What is al-
most equally important, there would be no ill feelings generated as a result of
the action taken. Unfortunately, such an agreement probably will never be
reached. Since there are those members of the press who are unwilling to exer-
cise any form of self-restraint, "it may be unreasonable to expect others to do
so." ' 0 2 Without the support of every member of the press, a proposal for cooper-
ation between the three groups is unlikely to have any effect in curtailing the
practice of "trial by newspaper."' 10 3
VI. THE SOLUTION: LEGISLATION
The most effective and realistic approach to the problem is the adoption of
legislation that would have the effect of deterring the publication of material
deemed prejudicial until there is no longer any possibility of endangering the
defendant's right to be tried by an impartial panel of jurors. Justice Meyer of
100. For a suggestion as to what could be done, see Television and the Accused, A
Report of the Committee on Civil Rights, New York County Lawyers Association 19 (1964).
101. Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 110
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 23 (1961); Otterbourg, Fair Trial and Free Press: A New Look in 1954,
40 A.B.A.J. 838 (1954); Rifkind, When the Press Collides With Justice, 34 J. Am. Jud.
Soc'y 46 (1950).
102. Lumbard, The Administration of Criminal Justice: Some Problems and Their Resolu-
tion, 49 A.B.A.J. 840, 844 (1963).
103. See the Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President
John F. Kennedy 242 (1964) (Warren Commission Report). The Commission went
on to state that, "the burden of insuring that appropriate action is taken to establish
ethical standards of conduct for the news media must also be borne, however, by State and
local governments, by the bar, and ultimately by the public. The experience in Dallas during
November 22-24 is a dramatic affirmation of the need for steps to bring about a proper
balance between the right of the public to be kept informed and the right of the individual
to a fair and impartial trial." Ibid.
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the New York Supreme Court has suggested an outline for such a statute,104
which if followed would greatly curtail the practice of "trial by newspaper."
Such a statute should not include out-of-court publications within the con-
tempt power, but should set up a new misdemeanor for which specific punish-
ment should be proxided. The statute should also contain provisions for pro-
cedure by information or indictment, trial by jury, and the right of appeal. At-
torneys, prosecutors, their employees and employees of police departments and
courts should be prohibited from furnishing the news media with information
that would not be publishable under the proposed statute.103 'Material that
should not be published would be contained in two sections. The first section
would contain a list of matter'0 0 that would constitute, if published, a "clear
and present danger" to the administration of justice. The second section would
consist of a list of matter 07 that might or might not present a serious and im-
minent danger of substantial prejudice, depending upon the circumstances
surrounding the publication. Such a determination would be made by the jury
trying the misdemeanor. Another section should be devoted to the point at
which proscription should begin and end.10 3
The question of the constitutionality of such a statute will, of course,
ultimately depend upon the United States Supreme Court. It would appear,
however, that the door has been left open for just such legislation. In Bridges
v. California,'0 0 the Court noted that it might have reached a different result
had the legislature "appraised a particular kind of situation and found a
specific danger sufficiently imminent to justify a restriction on a particular
104. Address by Justice Bernard S. Mleyer on the topic "Are Additional Remedis
Needed in the United States to Implement the Constitutional Guarantee of Fair Trial?)"
given before the National Conference of State Trial Judges at the 35th Annual Meeting of
the American Bar Association, August 4, 1962.
105. Senator Morse introduced a bill in the Senate which would have enabled the federal
courts to cite for contempt those who bear some responsibility for prejudicial publicity. M09
Cong. Rec. 11232 (daily ed. June 27, 1963). The bill, which was never reported out of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, read as follows: "It shall constitute a contempt of court for
any employee of the United States, or for any defendant or his attorney or the agent of
either, to publish information not already properly filed with the court, which might affect
the outcome of any pending criminal litigation, except evidence that has already been
admitted at the trial, and said contempt shall be punished summarily by the court, on the
motion of any party to the litigation. . ." Ibid.
106. Such a list should consist of the folloxing: confessions, any prior criminal record
of the accused, and expressions of opinion concerning the effect of evidence introduced, guilt
of the accused and credibility of witnesses.
107. Such a list should consist of the following: intervievs with the victim's family,
publication of the names and addresses of the jurors who are to hear the case, and matter
which appeals to racial, political, economic or other bias.
108. Proscription should begin the moment the crime is committed and continue until the
accused waives his right to a jury trial, or until the material is actually admitted in edence.
If such material is never admitted in evidence publication should be prohibited until the
jury reaches a verdict. If a retrial is ordered proscription should be reimpoed as soon as it
is ordered.
109. See notes 47-51 supra and accompanying text.
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kind of utterance."" 0 A statute drawn up in accord with the outline above
would comply with the suggestion made by Mr. Justice Black. The statute
would set forth specific acts which in the view of the legislature constituted
a "clear and present danger" to the administration of justice, and would
provide for prosecution if the statute is violated.
VII. CONCLUSION
The enactment of a statute which would deter all those responsible from
continuing to deprive the accused of his right to a fair trial is the only effective
answer to the question of what can be done to free the defendant from the
prejudicial effects of "trial by newspaper." Other proposals and the procedural
remedies available to a victim of the practice are unrealistic and inadequate.
They have been before the bench, the bar and the press for over thirty years,
and still the practice continues.
110. 314 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1941).
